Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.

نویسندگان

  • A Tversky
  • D Kahneman
چکیده

This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: (i) representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value is available. These heuristics are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead to systematic and predictable errors. A better understanding of these heuristics and of the biases to which they lead could improve judgements and decisions in situations of uncertainty.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Science

دوره 185 4157  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 1974