Policy-Motivated Parties in Dynamic Political Competition

We analyze a model of a dynamic political competition between two policy-motivated parties under uncertainty. The model suggests that electoral mandates matter: increasing the margin of victory in the previous election causes both parties to shift towards policies preferred by the winner, and the loser typically shifts more than the winner. The model also provides potential answers to a number of empirical puzzles in the field of electoral politics. In particular, we provide possible explanations for why close elections may lead to extreme platforms by both parties, why increased extremism in the platform of one party may lead to greater moderation in the platform of the other party, and why increasing polarization of the electorate causes winning candidates to become more sensitive to mandates. We also show that, contrary to previous findings, increasing uncertainty sometimes decreases platform divergence. Finally, we pay special attention to the proper methodology for doing numerical comparative statics analysis in computational models. We would like to thank James Adams, Jeff Grynaviski, Maggie Penn, the participants of the Harvard Workshop on Positive Political Economy, and anonymous referees for their feedback on these ideas. A copy of the most recent version of this paper can be found at http://jhfowler.ucdavis.edu. Earlier versions of this paper were prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and 2004 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. † (contact) PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, 1415 Kincaid St., PLC 936, Eugene, OR 97403-1284. (541) 684-8739. E-mail: [email protected]. ‡ Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616. (530) 752-1649. E-mail: [email protected].