Combining Measurements with Three-Dimensional Laser Scanning System and Coded Aperture Gamma-Ray Imaging System for International Safeguards Applications 2010 IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards, 1–5 November 2010, Vienna, Austria
نویسندگان
چکیده
Being able to verify the operator’s declaration in regard to the technical design of nuclear facilities is an important aspect of every safeguards approach. In addition to visual observation, it is necessary to know if nuclear material is present or has been present in undeclared piping and ducts. The possibility of combining the results from different measurement techniques into one easily interpreted product should optimize the inspection effort and increase safeguards effectiveness. A collaborative effort to investigate the possibility of combining measurements from a three-dimensional (3D) laser scanning system and gamma-ray imaging systems is under way. The feasibility of the concept has been previously proven with different laboratory prototypes of gamma-ray imaging systems. Recently, simultaneous measurements were conducted with a new highly portable, mechanically cooled, High Purity Germanium (HPGe), coded-aperture gamma-ray imager and a 3D laser scanner in an operational facility with complex configuration and different enrichment levels and quantities of uranium. With specially designed software, data from both instruments were combined and a 3D model of the facility was generated that also identified locations of radioactive sources. This paper provides an overview of the technology, describes the measurements, discusses the various safeguards scenarios addressed, and presents results of experiments.
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