An O(log n / log log n}) Upper Bound on the Price of Stability for Undirected Shapley Network Design Games

نویسنده

  • Jian Li
چکیده

Article history: Received 27 January 2009 Received in revised form 14 March 2009 Accepted 22 April 2009 Available online xxxx Communicated by F.Y.L. Chin

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Inf. Process. Lett.

دوره 109  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2009