Multiagent auctions for multiple items

نویسندگان

  • Houssein Ben Ameur
  • Brahim Chaib-draa
  • Peter Kropf
چکیده

Available resources can often be limited with regard to the number of demands. In this paper we propose an approach for solving this problem using the mechanisms of multi-item auctions for allocating the resources to a set of software agents. We consider the resource allocation problem as a market with vendor and buyer agents participating in a multi-item auction. The agents exhibit different acquisition capabilities which let them act differently depending on the current context or situation of the market. We present a model for this approach based on the English auction, and discuss experimental evidence of such a model.

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تاریخ انتشار 2001