Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms
نویسنده
چکیده
Mechanism Design has been developed as a significant tool to model and analyze markets, economies, and societies in the real-world. On the Internet, however, we face some unexpected problems such as false-name manipulations, and traditional mechanism design does not work sufficiently. In this thesis, we will developmechanism design into amore applicable theory for computer sciences and economics on the Internet. Specifically, we characterize social choice mechanisms that are robust against false-name manipulations.
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