punitive damages in international law

Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?

The paper explores the deterrent effect of punitive damages when capital investment is endogenous to the legal rule. Irrespective of the level of damages, firms can reduce their expected liabilities by either increasing safety (the law’s intended goal) or reducing wealth exposed to liability. We show that punitive damages can exacerbate this wealth reduction effect and thereby reduce deterrence...

Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm

Punitive Damages and Private Ordering Fetishism

Let me begin with some words of warm thanks, first to Professors Michael Krauss and David Owen for engaging my work with attention and interest and, second, to the editors at PENNumbra, for soliciting my reactions. This Reply’s principal goal is to clarify some areas in which I think Professors Krauss and Owen misunderstood some aspects of my proposed framework for restructuring punitive damage...

Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries Perform

A substantial recent literature has documented the inability of jurors to make sound decisions with respect to punitive damages, particularly for health, safety, and environmental torts. Included in this literature are experimental studies documenting the better performance of judges than jurors for the same case scenarios. Recent research by Eisenberg et al. (2002) has suggested, however, that...

A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages

One recurring problem in the punitive damages case law is the degree to which the wealth of the defendant should matter in the determination of a punitive award. Intuition suggests that the wealthy should pay more than the non-wealthy. On the other hand, the view has been expressed that wealth should not play a role in the determination of a punitive award. I will use examples to develop severa...

Environmental Citizen Suits with Pigovian Punitive Damages

Federal environmental laws encourage private citizens to act like "private attorney generals" and to sue a firm. This citizen group competes over the rewards of levels of regulation and enforcement. The firm can reduce its output to curtail the likelihood of losing the contest. This paper explores whether one can combine citizen suits with Pigovian punitive damages to equate private and social ...