Why not insure prices? Experimental evidence from Peru

In a competitive market, profit-maximizing producer's total revenue is determined both by the quantity of output she chooses to produce and price at which can sell that output. Of these two variables, only in part or wholly within control, being entirely market forces. Given that, it puzzling literature studying effects providing insurance producers low- middle-income countries has ignored risk entirely, focusing instead on insuring We run an artefactual lab-in-the-field experiment Peru look against production. randomize order three games: (i) baseline game introduced random, (ii) we add mandatory sold actuarially fair premium, (iii) voluntary but for offer random 0-, 50- 100% discount exogenize take-up. Our results show average, does not significantly change production relative certainty neither provision compulsory risk, introduction causes average producer more situations than certainty, (iv) cases where there no mandatory. When looking (v) this due almost rather selection into purchasing insurance. findings further suggest (vi) even absence discount, would have large (i.e., 70%) take-up rate.