When cheap talk is not that cheap – interviewing the super-rich about illegal wildlife consumption
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cheap talk when interests conflict.
Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank out...
متن کاملCheap Talk about the Detection Probability
This paper analyzes whether the behavior of potential offenders can be guided by information on the actual detection probability transmitted by the policy maker. It is established that, when viewed as a cheap-talk game, the existence of equilibria with information transmission depends on the level of the sanction, the level of costs related to imposing the sanction, and the level of social harm...
متن کاملSelecting Cheap-talk Equilibria Selecting Cheap-talk Equilibria
The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. For such commercial purposes contact the Office of the Econometric Society (contact inf...
متن کاملIntuition Talk is Not Methodologically Cheap : Empirically Testing the “ Received Wisdom ” about
The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic ...
متن کاملSelecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria∗
There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This paper identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for N...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Social Research Methodology
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1364-5579,1464-5300
DOI: 10.1080/13645579.2021.1904117