War and the Reelection Motive

Reelection threshold contracts in politics

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by p...

Reelection Incentives, Blacklisting and Deforestation in Brazil

Local political authority (formal or informal) over natural resources may create rents for politicians. The political decision to use or allocate resources involves balancing private rents with reelection prospects. I examine the case of deforestation in Brazil and a presidential decree granting the federal government the authority to punish counties that failed to limit total deforestation wit...

Mayoral Fiscal Performance and Reelection Success

a critical discourse analysis of the new york times and the tehran times news articles, covering the u.s.-led war in afghanistan

تحقیق حاضر متون خبری روزنامه های نیویورک تایمز و تهران تایمز را به صورت تحلیل انتقادی کلامی مورد بررسی قرارمی دهدکه درمورد جنگ به رهبری آ مریکا در افغانستان است. هدف از این تحقیق نشان دادن تاثیر ایدیولوژی و نگرشهای نویسندگان متون خبری است که ممکن است پنهان باشد. برای انجام این تحقیق 20 متن خبری) از هر روزنامه 10 متن خبری) به صورت تصادفی از سایت اینترنتی روزنامه های نیویورک تایمز و تهران تایمز ا...

The Profit Motive

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