Voting in Hiring Committees: Which “Almost” Rule is Optimal?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rings for which every simple module is almost injective
We introduce the class of “right almost V-rings” which is properly between the classes of right V-rings and right good rings. A ring R is called a right almost V-ring if every simple R-module is almost injective. It is proved that R is a right almost V-ring if and only if for every R-module M, any complement of every simple submodule of M is a direct summand. Moreover, R is a right almost V-rin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Group Decision and Negotiation
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0926-2644,1572-9907
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-017-9553-7