Voter preferences, voter manipulation, voter analytics: policy options for less surveillance and more autonomy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Voter Turnout and Preferences Aggregation∗
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Internet Policy Review
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2197-6775
DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1438