Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments
An extension of Von Neumann Morgenstern solution theory to cooperative games without side payments has been outlined in [1]. In this paper we revise some of the definitions given in [1] and prove that in the new theory every threeperson constant sum game is solvable (see [1, Theorem 1]). Other results that were formulated in [1] had already been proved in [2]. [1 ; 2] are also necessary for a f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society
سال: 1960
ISSN: 0002-9904
DOI: 10.1090/s0002-9904-1960-10418-1