Voluntarism and realism in medieval ethics.

Voluntarism and realism in medieval ethics.

In contrast to other articles in this series on the history of moral philosophy the present essay is not devoted to expounding the views of a single author, or to examining a particular moral theory. Instead it discusses an important dispute between two medieval accounts of the relation between theological and moral propositions. In addition to its historical interest this debate is important b...

Artificial Consciousness and Artificial Ethics: Between Realism and Social-Relationism

I compare a ‘realist’ with a ‘social-relational’ perspective on our judgments of the moral status of artificial agents (AAs). I develop a realist position according to which the moral status of a being particularly in relation to moral patiency attribution is closely bound up with that being’s ability to experience states of conscious satisfaction or suffering (CSS). For a realist both moral st...

Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism

Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology

Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in ...

Volitionism and Voluntarism about Belief

1. Introduction In the discussions about belief and the will, two sorts of issues tend to be conflated. One is psychological: can we, as matter of psychological fact, believe something at will, or under the influence of motivational factors? The other is normative: should we, as a matter of normative guidance, believe things for which we have practical, or pragmatic reasons? This ambiguity is p...