Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions
A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove that the functions for the allocation and the price determin...
متن کامل2 The Vickrey - Clarke - Groves ( VCG ) Mechanism
3 Examples of VCG mechanisms 5 3.1 Single-item auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Auctions of identical items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3 Procurement auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4 Public project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....
متن کاملExploring Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...
متن کاملExploring the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are procured through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...
متن کاملComment on “ Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey - Clarke - Groves Process is Not Practical ” by Michael Rothkopf
Whenever a research topic which has developed in one field spreads to new disciplines, there is the potential benefit of new perspectives and new tools opening unexplored avenues, and there is the potential danger of re-learning the old lessons of the originating discipline. The spread of auction theory and, more generally, mechanism design to computer science, operations research, and related ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1987
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90087-1