Vices, Virtues, and Dispositions

In this paper, we embark on the complicated discussion about nature of vice in Virtue Ethics through a twofold approach: first, by taking seriously claim that virtues (and certain flavours vices) are genuinely dispositional features possessed agents, and secondly, employing pluralistic attitude borrowed from Battaly’s pluralism (2008). Through these lenses, identify three varieties viciousness: incontinence, indifference, malevolence. The upshot is notion not as categorically homogeneous virtue: some states viciousness consist interference present virtuous dispositions, or mimicking absent vicious ones, whereas others can be considered genuine dispositions themselves. Furthermore, set-up provide an interesting, albeit highly idealized story to how, one’s environment, one gets acquainted with various degrees. Finally, approach illuminating vis-à-vis general; e.g. employ it discuss more productively Johnston’s (2003) objection Hursthouse’s (1999) account moral conduct. vis-a-vis