Viable Tax Constitutions

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چکیده

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Viable Tax Constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an o...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal

سال: 2003

ISSN: 1556-5068

DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1700430