Venus envy 2

Envy, Multi Envy, and Revenue Maximization

We study the envy free pricing problem faced by a seller who wishes to maximize revenue by setting prices for bundles of items. Consistent with standard usage [9] [10], we define an allocation/pricing to be envy free if no agent wishes to replace her allocation (and pricing) with those of another agent. If there is an unlimited supply of items and agents are single minded then we show that find...

Venus ® Diamond Venus ® Diamond Flow

Venus.

Mary Ellen Avery Treasurer Francisco J. Ayala Richard S. Nicholson Robert A. Frosch Executive Officer John Abelson Frederick W. Alt Don L. Anderson Stephen J. Benkovic David E. Bloom Floyd E. Bloom Henry R. Bourne James J. Bull Kathryn Calame C. Thomas Caskey Dennis W. Choi John M. Coffin Bruce F. Eldridge Paul T. Englund Richard G. Fairbanks Douglas T. Fearon Harry A. Fozzard Victor R. Fuchs T...

Envy Theory

Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy

In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent’s bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these two properties. We provide a procedure, base...