منابع مشابه
Towards Equilibrium Offers in Unit Commitment Auctions with Nonconvex Costs
We compare two types of uniform-price auction formats commonly used in wholesale electricity markets—centrally committed and self-committed markets. Auctions in both markets are conducted by an independent system operator that collects generator bids and determines which generators will operate and how much electricity each will produce. In centrally committed markets, generators submit twopart...
متن کاملUnit Commitment Solution using Fuzzy Dynamic Programming
Fuzzy Dynamic Programming approach to the solution of unit commitment problem is presented and described in detail. The Fuzzy Dynamic programming provides the ‘fuzzy’ preference in obtaining an optimal solution in the presence of conflicting objectives and constraints. The Fuzzy dynamic programming handles one objective (i.e. minimization of operational cost) and two constraints (i.e. generatio...
متن کاملA Novel Matching Formulation for Startup Costs in Unit Commitment
We present a novel formulation for startup cost computation in the unit commitment problem (UC). Both the proposed formulation and existing formulations in the literature are placed in a formal, theoretical dominance hierarchy based on their respective linear programming relaxations. The proposed formulation is tested empirically against existing formulations on large-scale unit commitment inst...
متن کاملUnit Commitment With Probabilistic Reserve
This paper demonstrates how a probabilistic criterion based on the full capacity outage probability distribution (e.g., LOLP) could be integrated into the unit commitment (UC) optimization using simple statistical approximation. While this provides a direct and computationally cheaper means as compared to a recently published approach to locating the globally optimal SR allocation (and associat...
متن کاملDynamic Communication with Commitment
I study the optimal communication problem in a dynamic principal-agent model. The agent observes the evolution of an imperfectly persistent state, and makes unverifiable reports of the state over time. The principal takes actions based solely on the agent’s reports, with commitment to a dynamic contract in the absence of transfers. Interests are misaligned: while the agent always prefers higher...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0885-8950,1558-0679
DOI: 10.1109/tpwrs.2012.2192141