Typicality and reasoning fallacies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Typicality and reasoning fallacies.
The work of Tversky and Kahneman on intuitive probability judgment leads to the following prediction: The judged probability that an instance belongs to a category is an increasing function of the typicality of the instance in the category. To test this prediction, subjects in Experiment 1 read a description of a person (e.g., "Linda is 31, bright, ... outspoken") followed by a category. Some s...
متن کاملExamining fallacies in diagnostic reasoning.
The paper by Gurova takes issue with the claim of Meehl that ‘understanding makes it normal’ is a fallacy in diagnostic reasoning [1,2]. Her paper prompts the more general question of appropriate methods for testing whether a specific way of reasoning in making a clinical diagnosis is fallacious. So prompted, I will compare the methods that the Gurova paper deploys with some of requirements for...
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In this work we summarize our recent results on extending Description Logics for reasoning about prototypical properties and inheritance with exceptions. First, we focus our attention on the logic ALC. We present a nonmonotonic logic ALC + Tmin, which is built upon a monotonic logic ALC+T obtained by adding a typicality operator T to ALC. The operator T is intended to select the “most normal” o...
متن کاملReasoning about Typicality in Preferential Description Logics
In this paper we propose a nonmonotonic extension ALC + Tmin of the Description Logic ALC for reasoning about prototypical properties and inheritance with exception. The logic ALC + Tmin is built upon a previously introduced (monotonic) logic ALC + T, that is obtained by adding a typicality operator T to ALC. The operator T is intended to select the “most normal” or “most typical” instances of ...
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Anthropic arguments in multiverse cosmology and string theory rely on the weak anthropic principle (WAP). We show that the principle is fundamentally ambiguous. It can be formulated in one of two ways, which we refer to as WAP1 and WAP2. We show that WAP2, the version most commonly used in anthropic reasoning, makes no physical predictions unless supplemented by a further assumption of “typical...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Memory & Cognition
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0090-502X,1532-5946
DOI: 10.3758/bf03213877