Two Level Principal-Agent Analysis in Farmland Transfer
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
critical discourse analysis of two political speeches in light of bakhtins dialogism
چکیده گفتگوگری باختین نظریه ای است که به تفاوت ها احترام گذاشته و گفتگو را ارج می نهد. رشته های مختلف علوم انسانی همواره از این نظریه بهره جسته اند. با وجود این تنها مطالعات اندکی در زمینه تجزیه و تحلیل نقادانه کلام به نظریه گفتگوگری پرداخته اند. پنداشت تحقیق حاضر بر آن است که احترام به حقوق دیگران از طریق فراهم آوردن شرایط یکسان برای بیان نظریات مختلف یکی از مهمترین مشترکات تحلیل انتقادی گفتم...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2164-5167,2164-5175
DOI: 10.4236/ajibm.2019.93028