منابع مشابه
Axiomatising Incomplete Preferences through Sets of Desirable Gambles
We establish the equivalence of two very general theories: the first is the decisiontheoretic formalisation of incomplete preferences based on the mixture independence axiom; the second is the theory of coherent sets of desirable gambles (bounded variables) developed in the context of imprecise probability and extended here to vector-valued gambles. Such an equivalence allows us to analyse the ...
متن کاملPreferences Show Greater Stability for Transactions than for Gambles in Cost Discounting
Many factors point to the underlying instability of preferences in choice behavior. In particular, discounting reveals some effects not consistent with stable preferences. In discounting, the subjective value of a reward reduces as the uncertainty of or delay to obtaining it increases. The function relating subjective value to delay or probability must be exponential with a constant discount ra...
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We argue that “narrow framing,” whereby an agent who is offered a new gamble evaluates that gamble in isolation, may be a more important feature of decisionmaking than previously realized. Our starting point is the evidence that people are often averse to a small, independent gamble, even when the gamble is actuarially favorable. We find that a surprisingly wide range of utility functions, incl...
متن کاملThe Shapley value in totally convex multichoice games
-In this paper, we introduce a class of totally convex multichoice cooperative games a.nd prove that the Shapley value of such games is always in the core. @ 2000 Elsevier Science I~td. All rights reserved. K e y w o r d s M u l t i c h o i c e game, Shapley value, Total convexity, Core, Coalition. 1. I N T R O D U C T I O N Hsiao and R a g h a v a n [1] i n t roduced a class of mul t ichoice c...
متن کاملAgent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games
We examine the impact of independent agents failures on the solutions of cooperative games, focusing on totally balanced games and the more speci c subclass of convex games. We follow the reliability extension model, recently proposed in [1] and show that a (approximately) totally balanced (or convex) game remains (approximately) totally balanced (or convex) when independent agent failures are ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00074-9