Tombs, Steve, Social Protection After the Crisis: Regulation Without Enforcement.

Cooperation Without Enforcement

Online reputation mechanisms are emerging as a promising alternative to more established mechanisms for promoting trust and cooperative behavior, such as legally enforceable contracts. As information technology dramatically reduces the cost of accumulating, processing and disseminating consumer feedback, it is plausible to ask whether such mechanisms can provide an economically more efficient s...

Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?

The paper discusses the reform of capital regulation of banks in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2009. Whereas the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seems to go for marginal changes here and there, the paper calls for a thorough overhaul, moving away from risk calibration and raising capital requirements very substantially. The argument is based on the observation that the current...

Selective enforcement of regulation

Regulatory agencies may, whether outside of set rules or within their discretion, depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules, which we term selective enforcement. Taking China, a country in transition, as an example, and using cases and large-sample tests, we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement. The results show that the China Securities Regulatory ...

An Exchange Protocol without Enforcement

In multiagent systems, interaction protocols are usually enforced by law. Enforcement is problematic among computational agents, because they may operate under incomplete or different laws, the laws may not be uniformly enforced, and the agents can vanish easily. This paper presents an enforcement free method for carrying out exchanges so that both agents are motivated to abide to their contrac...

The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement