The Weighted Surplus Division Value for Cooperative Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al., 2014). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wett...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Symmetry
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2073-8994
DOI: 10.3390/sym11091169