The two-step average tree value for graph and hypergraph games

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract We introduce the two-step average tree value for transferable utility games with restricted cooperation represented by undirected communication graphs or hypergraphs. The solution can be considered as an alternative both graph and hypergraph games. Instead of averaging players’ marginal contributions corresponding to all admissible rooted spanning trees underlying (hyper)graph, which determines value, we consider a procedure, in first, each player that have this root is calculated, second, over players payoffs obtained first step computed. In general these two approaches lead different concepts. Contrary new satisfies component fairness total equal treatment property on entire class Moreover, axiomatized semi-cycle-free games, more than cycle-free allowing hypergraphs contain certain cycles. also core stable subclass superadditive

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Annals of Operations Research

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1572-9338', '0254-5330']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04966-z