The ordinal Nash social welfare function

Ordinal Nash Social Welfare Function

A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed based on risk preferences and assuming a common, worst social state for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterisation of the solution is a weak version of IIA, in which only the relative risk position with respect to the worst state is considered. Thus the resulting social preference takes into account non (necessarily) ...

The ordinal Nash social welfare function

A social welfare function entitled ‘ordinal Nash’ is proposed. It is based on risk preferences and assumes a common, worst social tate (origin) for all individuals. The crucial axiom in the characterization of the function is a weak version of independence of rrelevant alternatives. This axiom considers relative risk positions with respect to the origin. Thus, the resulting social preference ak...

The Nash Social Welfare Function

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Are social welfare functions ordinal or cardinal ?

Greedy Algorithms for Maximizing Nash Social Welfare

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the agents for their bundles. While the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare is known to be APX-hard in general, we study the effectiveness of simple, gree...