منابع مشابه
The Optimality of Team Contracts
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others’ effort levels and draft enforceable side-contracts on effort levels and realized returns. Standard constraints, resulting in incentive contracts, fa...
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With the knowledge that team work is not always associated with high(er) performance, we draw from the Multi-Level Theory of Psychological Contracts, Person-Environment Fit Theory, and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory to study shared perceptions of psychological contract (PC) breach in relation to shared perceptions of complementary and supplementary fit to explain why some teams perform better t...
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It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social forces in mechanism design and contract theory. We devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in a hidden information context. A principal offers one of three possible contract menus to a team of two...
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Authors are encouraged to submit new papers to INFORMS journals by means of a style file template, which includes the journal title. However, use of a template does not certify that the paper has been accepted for publication in the named journal. INFORMS journal templates are for the exclusive purpose of submitting to an INFORMS journal and should not be used to distribute the papers in print ...
متن کاملThe Non-Optimality of Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: An Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance
Insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource allocation problem in many markets. One explanation is the non-optimality of traditional insurance contracts. The object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the falsification behavior of an insured. This type of contract is observed in many markets, even if it is not optimal under costly state falsif...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g4040670