The Nash Bargaining Solution is Nash Implementable
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution∗
The coalitional Nash bargaining solution is defined to be the core allocation for which the Nash product is maximal. We consider a non-cooperative model in which one team may form. The grand team, consisting of all players, generates the largest surplus. But a smaller team may form. We show that as players get more patient if an efficient and stationary equilibrium exists, it must deliver payof...
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We characterize the Nash bargaining solution replacing the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with three independent axioms: Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives, Twisting, and Disagreement Point Convexity. We give a non-cooperative bargaining interpretation to this last axiom. JEL Classification, C72, C78. ∗We thank Marco Mariotti, two anonymous referees and an ...
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Policy formation is a process of political interaction among individuals and groups. While some participants in the political process may share similar, or even identical interests, the political preferences of other participants diverge so that conflicts of interest among participating parties are unavoidable. Nevertheless, such conflicts are often resolved in the policy formulation process. T...
متن کاملCore-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution
Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results ...
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I prove that ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’ characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of twoplayer bargaining problems and on the class of smooth bargaining problems. I propose an example to show that these two axioms do not characterize the Nash bargaining solution on the class of bargaining problems with more than two players. I prove that the other solu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 1998
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.57908