The Loser’s Bliss in Auctions with Price Externality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Loser's Bliss in Auctions with Price Externality
We consider auctions with price externality where all bidders derive utility from the winning price, such as charity auctions. In addition to the benefit to the winning bidder, all bidders obtain a benefit that is increasing in the winning price. Theory makes two predictions in such settings: First, individual bids will be increasing in the multiplier on the winning price. Second, individual bi...
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We study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with a¢ liated values. We show that the second-price auction minimizes revenue among all e¢ cient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays, and the price only depends on the losersbids. In particular, we show that the k-th price auction generates higher revenue than the second-price auction, for all k > 2. If rationing is allo...
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This paper revisits the standard analysis of licensing a cost reducing innovation by an outside innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract. The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary licensing without reducing bid...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2073-4336
DOI: 10.3390/g6030191