The Interval Efficiency Evaluation Model Based on Incentive Compatibility

Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility

We show that when agents become informationally negligible in a large economy with asymmetric information, every ex ante efficient allocation must be incentive compatible. This means that any ex ante core or Walrasian allocation is incentive compatible. The corresponding result is false for fixedfinite-agent economies with asymmetric information. An example is also constructed to show that the ...

Cross-Efficiency Evaluation Based on an Interval Method

mortality forecasting based on lee-carter model

over the past decades a number of approaches have been applied for forecasting mortality. in 1992, a new method for long-run forecast of the level and age pattern of mortality was published by lee and carter. this method was welcomed by many authors so it was extended through a wider class of generalized, parametric and nonlinear model. this model represents one of the most influential recent d...

Ambiguity aversion solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility∗

The conflict between Pareto optimality and incentive compatibility, that is, the fact that some Pareto optimal (efficient) allocations are not incentive compatible is a fundamental fact in information economics, mechanism design and general equilibrium with asymmetric information. This important result was obtained assuming that the individuals are expected utility maximizers. Although this ass...

Existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency of the rational expectations equilibrium

The rational expectations equilibrium (REE), as introduced in Radner (1979) in a general equilibrium setting à la Arrow-Debreu-Mckenzie, often fails to have normative properties such as universal existence, incentive compatibility and efficiency. We resolve those problems by providing a new model which makes the standard REE a desirable solution concept. In particular, we consider an asymmetric...