The fairest core in cooperative games with transferable utilities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The fairest core in cooperative games with transferable utilities
The core and the Shapley value are important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. While the core is designed for the stability of the game, the Shapley value aims for fairness among the players. However, the Shapley value might not lie within the core and a core solution might not be ‘fair’. We introduce a new solution concept called the ‘fairest core’, one that aims for both stability...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research Letters
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0167-6377
DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2014.11.001