The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games
In 1951, Dantzig showed the equivalence of linear programming problems and two-person zerosum games. However, in the description of his reduction from linear programs to zero-sum games, he noted that there was one case in which the reduction does not work. This also led to incomplete proofs of the relationship between the Minimax Theorem of game theory and the Strong Duality Theorem of linear p...
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In 1951, Dantzig [3] showed the equivalence of linear programming and two-person zero-sum games. However, in the description of his reduction from linear programming to zero-sum games, he noted that there was one case in which his reduction does not work. This also led to incomplete proofs of the relationship between the Minmax Theorem of game theory and the Strong Duality Theorem of linear pro...
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As in optimal control theory, linear quadratic (LQ) differential games (DG) can be solved, even in high dimension, via a Riccati equation. However, contrary to the control case, existence of the solution of the Riccati equation is not necessary for the existence of a closed-loop saddle point. One may “survive” a particular, non generic, type of conjugate point. An important application of LQDG’...
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In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...
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Classes of two-person zero-sum games termed "equivalent games" are defined. These are games with identical value and identical optimal mixed-strategies but with different matrix entries and thus different opportunities for exploiting a nonrational opponent. An experiment was conducted to investigate the strategy-choice behavior of subjects playing pairs of these "equivalent games." Also investi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0328-8