The Economics of Permissible WTO Retaliation

Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity

This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive inefficient because the incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation. It strongly limits the effects of com...

The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

Retaliation Against Protocol Attacks

Security protocols intend to give their parties reasonable assurance that certain security properties will protect their communication session. However, the literature confirms that the protocols may suffer subtle and hidden attacks. Flawed protocols are customarily sent back to the design process, but the costs of reengineering a deployed protocol may be prohibitive. This paper outlines the co...

The Methodology of Islamic Economics

his paper investigates the conformity of market participants’ decisions with the Islamic codes of conduct from the economic and philosophical perspectives. At the outset, the contributions of the renowned contemporary Muslim philosophers on the epistemological issues between the “is” and the “ought” are presented. Subsequently, a synthesized construct that would resolve the dichotomy between th...

Redesigning the WTO

Redesigning the WTO for the 21 Century November 9, 2009 The Program in International Finance and Economic Policy (IFEP) at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), in conjunction with Columbia University’s Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Study Center, presented a panel discussion about the present and future of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Debra Steger, Professo...