The core and superdifferential of a fuzzy TU-cooperative game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Strong Accessibility of the Core of TU Cooperative Game
In the paper, a strengthening of the core-accessibility theorem by the author is proposed. It is shown that for any imputation outside of the nonempty core of TU cooperative game a strongly monotonic trajectory originating from this imputation exists, which converges to some element of the core. Here, strong monotonicity means that each imputation from the trajectory dominates several preceding...
متن کاملThe Core of a Cooperative Game
The main fundamental question in cooperative game theory is the question how to allocate the total generated wealth by the collective of all players—the player set N itself—over the different players in the game. In other words, what binding contract between the players in N has to be written? Various criteria have been developed. In this chapter I investigate contracts that are stable against ...
متن کاملThe positive core of a cooperative game
The positive core is a nonempty extension of the core of transferable utility games. If the core is nonempty, then it coincides with the core. It shares many properties with the core. Six well-known axioms which are employed in some axiomatizations of the core, the prenucleolus, or the positive prekernel, and one new intuitive axiom, characterize the positive core on any infinite universe of pl...
متن کاملThe Core of a Cooperative Game
The main fundamental question in cooperative game theory is the question how to allocate the total generated wealth by the collective of all players—the player set N itself—over the different players in the game. In other words, what binding contract between the players in N has to be written? Various criteria have been developed. In this chapter I investigate contracts that are stable against ...
متن کاملOn reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games
We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new property, called max-intersection, related with the vector lattice structure of cooperative games with transferable utility. In particular, it is shown that the core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonability, max-intersection and modularity.
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2074-9872
DOI: 10.17076/mgta_2020_2_14