The anti-collusion dilemma: Information sharing of the supply chain under buyback contracts

While previous studies did not consider that buyback contracts in collusive research of supply chains and the contract particularly strengthens collusion between retailers chain, we address a new question: What is effect different retailer patterns information sharing mechanisms on benefits each member with contracts? To answer this question, develop four two-echelon chain models. The model consists one supplier two competing retailers. We dimensions mode type derive optimal equilibrium solutions for member. theoretical analysis demonstrates following results: (i) With explicit collusion, are less willing to vertically share supplier. (ii) Tacit low demand uncertainty motivates because wholesale price can correctly convey supplier’s (iii) Increasing probability high or reducing rate benefit all members chain. (iv) Different from revenue contract, whole sustains losses vertical under condition uncertainty. A numerical experiment shows interesting insights: Although generally brings profit improvement retailers, they prefer choose tacit effectively identify signals when lower. check robustness results find main will be changed extended where lower than price.