Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality

Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach (Research in Economics 53: 117-147, 1999), Hurley (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26: 264-265, 2003), Sugden (Philosophical Explorations 6(3):165-181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bac...

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Team reasoning and collective rationality: piercing the veil of obviousness.

The experiments reported in our target article provide strong evidence of collective utility maximization, and the findings suggest that team reasoning should now be included among the social value orientations used in cognitive and social psychology. Evidential decision theory offers a possible alternative explanation for our results but fails to predict intuitively compelling strategy choices...

Collective rationality in interactive decisions: evidence for team reasoning.

Decision theory and game theory rest on a fundamental assumption that players seek to maximize their individual utilities, but in some interactive decisions it seems intuitively reasonable to aim to maximize the utility of the group of players as a whole. Such team reasoning requires collective preferences and a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. Findings from two expe...

Collective Intentions and Team Agency

In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipu...