Tariffs with private information and reputation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputation and exogenous private learning
I consider a modified version of the chain store game in which the short-run competitors receive noisy signals of the long-run incumbent firm’s type. The history of signals is observable to the competitors but not to the incumbent. There are two main results. First, for any p ∈ (0, 1) there exists a T < ∞ such that within T periods the competitors assign belief p to the incumbent’s realized typ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/0022-1996(90)90063-r