Symmetric Convex Games and Stable Structures

Event Structures, Stable Families and Concurrent Games

ion λx ∶ A.σ ∶ A⊸ B. Because probabilistic strategies form a monoidalclosed bicategory, with tensor A∥B and function space A⊸ B =def A ⊥∥B, they support an (linear) λ-calculus, which in this context permits process-passing as in [?]. Recursive types and probabilistic processes can be dealt with along standard lines [?]. The types as they stand are somewhat inflexible. For example, that maps of ...

A review on symmetric games: theory, comparison and applications

Game theory models decision makers' behaviors in strategic situations. Since the structures of games are different, behavior and preferences of the players are different in various types of game. This paper reviews various situations of games. Here, characteristics of some common games are discussed and compared. Specifically, we focus on a group of games called symmetric games including Prison...

Convex vNM-stable sets for linear production games

Computing stable outcomes in symmetric additively-separable hedonic games

We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of such games that are guaranteed to possess stable outcomes. These games are specified by an undirected edgeweighted graph: nodes are players, an outcome of t...

Cores of convex and strictly convex games

We follow the path initiated in Shapley (1971) and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal’s triangle. JEL classification: C71.