Symbolic values, occupational choice, and economic development
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Occupational choice and development
The rise in world trade since 1970 has raised international mobility of labor services. We study the effect of such a globalization of the world’s labor markets. We find that when people can choose between wage work and managerial work, the output gains are U-shaped: A worldwide labor market raises output by more in the rich and the poor countries, and by less in the middle-income countries. Th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.04.006