Swiss land improvement syndicates: ‘Impure’ Coasian solutions?

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Impure altruism and impure selfishness

Altruism refers to a willingness to benefit others, even at one’s own expense. In contrast, selfishness refers to prioritizing one’s own interests with no consideration for others. However, even if an agent is selfish, he might nevertheless act as if he were altruistic out of selfish concerns triggered when his action is observed; that is, he might seek to feel pride in acting altruistically an...

متن کامل

Impure Altruism and Impure Selfishness: Online Appendix

We provide an extention of GU model that incorporates a decision maker who is averse to inequality of allocations among other agents. We also provide a detaled discussion on the experiments on dictator games with an exit option.

متن کامل

Eavesdropping Syndicates in Cellular Communications

W e consider eavesdropping strategies f o r a syndicate consisting of a number of co-operative eavesdroppers employing selective diversity in a wireless communica t ion cell. T h e potent ial f o r performance improvemen t over t h a t of a single eavesdropper is analyzed. Per formance l im i t s are developed by considering a syndicate w i t h a n arbitrari ly large supply of eavesdroppers. O ...

متن کامل

Improvement of Land Management in Ukraine

< p>Successful implementation of land reform requires the implementation of large-scale market transformations, in particular in the structure of land tenure and land use, in the field of land valuation. The article is devoted to the development of scientific and methodological bases of economic evaluation and use of land resources of agricultural enterprises, substantiation of approaches and r...

متن کامل

Issuers, Underwriter Syndicates, and Aftermarket Transparency *

I model strategic interaction between issuers, underwriters, retail investors, and institutional investors when the secondary market has limited price transparency. Search costs for retail investors lead to price dispersion in the secondary market, while the price for institutional investors is infinitely elastic. Because retail distribution capacity is assumed to be limited for each underwrite...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Planning Theory

سال: 2020

ISSN: 1473-0952,1741-3052

DOI: 10.1177/1473095220923629