Sustaining Collusion under Economic Integration
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sustaining Collusion under Economic Integration
In this paper, we aim at investigating from a game theory perspective whether trade liberalization can promote a collusive intra-industry trade and whether such a collusive trade is always socially desirable compared to the autarchy solution. We show that, under Cournot competition, economic integration is anti-competitive if collusive trade is a possible outcome of the repeated game; under pri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0965-7576,1467-9396
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00664.x