Surprisingly rational: Probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Surprisingly rational: probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.
The systematic biases seen in people's probability judgments are typically taken as evidence that people do not use the rules of probability theory when reasoning about probability but instead use heuristics, which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes yield systematic biases. This view has had a major impact in economics, law, medicine, and other fields; indeed, the idea that peop...
متن کاملTitle Surprisingly rational : Probability theory plus noise explainsbiases in judgment
The systematic biases seen in people’s probability judgments are typically taken as evidence that people do not reason about probability using the rules of probability theory, but instead use heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes systematic biases. This view has had a major impact in economics, law, medicine, and other fields; indeed, the idea that people cannot re...
متن کاملSurprisingly Rational: Evidence that people follow probability theory when judging probabilities, and that biases in judgment are due to noise
The systematic biases seen in people’s probability judgments are typically taken as evidence that people do not reason about probability using the rules of probability theory, but instead use heuristics which sometimes yield reasonable judgments and sometimes severe and systematic errors. This ‘heuristics and biases’ view has had a major impact in economics, law, medicine, and other fields; ind...
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متن کاملAn associative framework for probability judgment: an application to biases.
Three experiments show that understanding of biases in probability judgment can be improved by extending the application of the associative-learning framework. In Experiment 1, the authors used M. A. Gluck and G. H. Bower's (1988a) diagnostic-learning task to replicate apparent base-rate neglect and to induce the conjunction fallacy in a later judgment phase as a by-product of the conversion bi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Psychological Review
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1939-1471,0033-295X
DOI: 10.1037/a0037010