Supervision, Pay, and Effort
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
All-Pay Contests with Productive Effort
I consider competitions in which, conditional on winning or losing, the effort exerted by a competitor does not necessarily decrease his payoff. This happens, for example, in competitions for promotions in which workers are intrinsically motivated, and in research and development races in which better performance implies a higher payoff from winning. I characterize players’ equilibrium payoffs ...
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We test predictions from theories of tournament, fairness and tastes for skewness about the effects of pay spread and skewness on employee effort and firm productivity. The data come from the population of 6,501 medium-to-large sized Danish private sector firms matched with all their employees during 1992-95. Potential simultaneity problems are addressed by instrumental variables provided by in...
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This study uses a three-person gift-exchange game experiment to examine the impact of pay comparisons on effort behavior. We compare effort choices made in a treatment where coworkers’ wages are secret with effort choices made in two ‘public wages’ treatments. The two ‘public wages’ treatments differ in whether co-workers’ wages are chosen by an employer, or are fixed exogenously by the experim...
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We study worker behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers’ wages can influence a worker’s effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers’ responsiveness to co-workers’ wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress wages. Our laboratory experiments, on the other hand, show that --while workers’ effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages-effort is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Forces
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0037-7732,1534-7605
DOI: 10.1093/sf/sou049