Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation
We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through both public and private observation of other agents’ actions. We provide an explicit solution for the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. When the private learning channel is present, we show that convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect-information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of th...
متن کاملRepeated Charitable Contributions under Incomplete Information*
Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both s...
متن کاملPublic rationing and private cost incentives
This paper considers a public provider’s strategic use of rationing in a market served by both public and private providers. Such a ‘mixed’ market structure is common in many industries such as health care, telecommunication, postal service, and public utilities. The technology in the private sector exhibits increasing returns: each firm can expend ‘effort’ in the form of fixed cost to reduce t...
متن کاملEquilibria and incentives in private information economies
This paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy, namely, Walrasian expectations equilibrium, private core, and insurance equilibrium. It shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy. In contrast to the finite-agent setting, one can construct a large private information economy in wh...
متن کاملEssays on Individual Incentives and Private Information
Business Administration) Essays on Individual Incentives and Private Information by Shouqiang Wang Department of Business Administration Duke University
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1097644