Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations
We introduce a new approach to study subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games: the differential equations approach. We apply our approach to quitting games with perfect information. Those are sequential game in which at every stage one of n players is chosen; each player is chosen with probability 1/n. The chosen player i decides whether he quits, in which case the game terminate...
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We present an experiment that attempts to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games–subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01260-6