منابع مشابه
Strategy-proof Judgment Aggregation
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibba...
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We consider the problem of allotting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We...
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An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one’s own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail th...
متن کاملStrategy-Proof Voting Rules over Restricted Domains
We have seen in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 that in some voting games, strategic behavior sometimes leads to extremely undesirable outcomes. Therefore, we may want to prevent voters’ strategic behavior. However, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem tells us that for any voting rule that satisfies some natural properties, there must exist at least one voter who has an incentive to misreport her prefer...
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In his pioneering article, (in ‘‘Decision and Organization’’ (C. B. McGuire and R. Radner, Eds.), pp. 297–336, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972) Hurwicz establishes that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and individually rational rule for pure exchange economies with two agents and two goods, provided that the domain includes a sufficiently wide class of classical preferences. In this...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.09.010