Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities

نویسندگان

چکیده

We investigate the strategy-proof provision and financing of indivisible club good facilities when individuals are subject to congestion costs that non-decreasing in number other members a private type parameter. An allocation rule specifies how be partitioned into clubs shared by as function types. show some combinations our axioms incompatible continuous strictly increasing parameter, but all them compatible if dichotomous there is equal cost sharing. present examples rules with sharing determine which they satisfy linear also using iterative voting on ascending size partition not, general, each facility’s equally.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1434-4742', '1434-4750']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00251-w