Strategically Reasonable Indifference?

نویسندگان

چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Preventing 'deaths by indifference': identification of reasonable adjustments is key.

People with intellectual disabilities are at risk of premature death due to failings in healthcare provision. To prevent this, it is important for healthcare services to identify and flag not only vulnerable conditions (including intellectual disability, dementia and mental health problems), but also the specific adjustments needed by individual patients.

متن کامل

Designing experiences strategically☆

a r t i c l e i n f o Companies willing to enter into the experience economy have available procedures for experience design and evaluation but not for strategic decision-making on what experiences to incorporate into their offering. This study presents a procedure for identifying experiences and for assessing their customer value. The fieldwork consists of a logbook technique for experience id...

متن کامل

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify stra...

متن کامل

Strategically Mobile Agents

To realize its promise of providing scaleable and optimal use of network resources, mobile agent technology must be integrated with non-mobile architectures (e.g., client-server) while taking into account the specific needs of applications. This paper introduces a general characterization of mobile agent applications that provides a framework for reasoning about such optimization issues. This f...

متن کامل

Strategically Valuable Information

Abstract: In this paper, we extend the Blackwell (1953) comparison of experiments to a strategic setting. We introduce a new partial order more strategically informative — information held by players is “better” — and prove it is equivalent to the partial order more strategically valuable — the ability to induce more equilibrium payoff vectors in all Bayesian games. The conditions we provide ar...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: CFA Institute Magazine

سال: 2012

ISSN: 1543-1398

DOI: 10.2469/cfm.v23.n3.22