Strategic interaction and conventions

Conventions and Local Interaction Structures:

We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine in how far local interaction structures have effects on players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: first, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interact...

Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence

Interaction Structure and the Evolution of Conventions∗

This paper studies long run equilibrium selection in 2x2 coordination games in a framework that accounts for the effect of players’ mobility, local interaction, and scale of interaction. I find that the stochastic stability of a particular convention depends both on the importance of scale effects relative to the degree of local interaction, and the efficiency and risk characteristics of a part...

investigating the interaction of language knowledge and strategic competence in the performance of efl learners on reading-to-write and writing-only test tasks

این مطالعه به دو روش کمی و کیفی و با هدف بررسی استراتژی های فراشناختی فراگیران زبان انگلیسی به عنوان زبان خارجی در دو آزمون نوشتن و نوشتن ترکیبی انجام پذیرفت. در بخش کمی برای سنجش میزان استراتژی های فراشناختی از یک پرسشنامه که بر اساس مدل بکمن و پالمر (1996) ساخته شده بود استفاده شد. پایایی و روایی سازه ی پرسشنامه هنگام مطالعه ی پایلوت و روایی محتوای آن با جمع آوری نظرات نُه متخصص در رشته سنجیده...

Segregation and Strategic Neighborhood Interaction

We introduce non-type based, social interaction preferences into a Schelling model of residential choice. These social interactions take the form of a Prisoner’s Dilemma played with neighbors in the Schelling model. We begin by studying two models independently. We study the Schelling model over a wide range of utility functions and then proceed to study a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma model. Thes...