منابع مشابه
Strategic analysis of influence peddling
This paper analyzes Inuence Peddlingwith interaction between human capital transfer and collusion-building aspects in a model, in which each government o¢ cial regulates multiple rms simultaneously. We show that (i) there exists an optimal division rule for collusion between a sequence of quali edregulators and a rm; (ii) as the regulators increasingly bene t from the collusion, they s...
متن کاملPeddling Influence through Intermediaries: Propaganda∗
Information may be transmitted directly from a sender to a receiver, or indirectly through intermediaries. How do intermediaries affect the reporting truthfulness of an informed sender? When does he prefer using intermediaries? In this model, an objective sender or intermediary passes on information truthfully, while a biased one wants to push a particular agenda but also has reputational conce...
متن کاملPeddling Influence through Well Informed Intermediaries∗
A sender with private information often tries to influence the decisionmaker through well-informed intermediaries such as experts or critics. Both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased: the objective type passes on the most accurate information, while the biased type wants to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective. Although using one’s own infor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0340-z